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SUING AN INFRINGING COMPETITOR'S
CUSTOMERS: OR, LIFE UNDER THE
SINGLE RECOVERY RULE
JERRY R. SELINGER* & JESSICA W. YOUNG**

This article considers a patentee's rights against an infringing
competitor's customers. 1 First, the various types of infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 are set forth. As a product moves along the
distribution chain, each actor along that chain may be liable for infringement. As a result, the issue of monetary recovery against
these actors may become important.
Suit normally can be filed against infringers wherever they
may be along a product distribution chain. In the ordinary course
of events, however, there is likely to be only a single recovery of
damages. Still, there are several opportunities for creative lawyering around the ordinary situation. These opportunities are discussed below.
I.

THE VARIOUS TYPES OF INFRINGEMENT

Section 271 of Title 35 defines several forms of infringement.
Section 271(a) defines a direct infringer as anyone who, inter alia,
"makes, uses, offers to sell [or] sells any patented invention, within
the United States ... ." A manufacturer who makes and sells an

infringing product is a direct infringer under each of the making
* B.S. cum laude in Engineering Science, 1969, S.U.N.Y. at Buffalo; M.S.,
1971 Columbia University; J.D. with highest honors, 1975, George Washington University; Board Certified, Civil Appellate Law, Texas Board of Legal

Specialization. Mr. Selinger is a shareholder in the Dallas office of Jenkens &
Gilchrist, P.C.
** B.S.E., cum laude in Biomedical Engineering, 1990, Duke University;
J.D., with honors, 1994, University of Texas at Austin. Ms. Young is an associate in the Dallas office of Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C.
1. This article does not address the business or political questions that
arise when a patentee and an infringing competitor share customers. Business executives who favor expediency over technical legal niceties most often
answer this fairly common question. Instead, the focus here is on what legal
options a patentee may pursue.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). Section 271(a) states, "Except as otherwise
provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent." Id.
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and selling clauses.3 A customer of the manufacturing infringer
who uses the infringing product also directly infringes under the
using clause.' Under the selling clause, a customer who resells the
infringing product is also a direct infringer.5 Furthermore, a patent that includes component and system claims or combination
and subcombination claims can be directly infringed by both the
competitor who sells the component and its customer who assembles and sells the component in a system.6
Section 271(b) makes the act of active inducement of infringement an infringement itself.7 Inducement of infringement of
a patent occurs when one knowingly causes, urges, encourages or
aids another in infringement, even though the inducer has not itself directly infringed any claim of the patent by making, using or
selling the patented invention.8 There are a number of recognized
indicia of inducement.9 However, direct infringement must exist

3. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 106 F.2d
769, 774 (9th Cir. 1939) (finding that the manufacture of a patented tractor is
considered an infringement regardless of whether the tractor was actually
used). See also Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d
209, 212 (2d Cir. 1926) (concluding that the sale of a non-infringing device is
still an infringement of the patent if the device is capable of an infringing use
and is sold with the intent that it be used in such a manner); Bassick Mfg. Co.
v. Auto Equip. Co., 13 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1926) (holding that parts manufactured for use, even if not used, constitute infringement).
4. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377
U.S. 476, 484 (1964) (stating, "it
has often and clearly been held that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement").
5. Triangle Conduit & Cable Co., Inc. v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 138
F.2d 46, 48 (3rd Cir. 1943). See also Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co.,
Inc., 132 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1942) (finding that it was infringement for
defendant to buy patented parts of vacuums from junkman and resell them in
reconditioned vacuums because the license implied from sales in usual channels of trade does not apply to an article to be scrapped).
6. See Warner & Swasey Co. v. Held, 256 F. Supp. 303, 311 (E.D. Wis.
1966) ("supply[ing] patented parts of a patented combination without authority from the patentee to purchasers of the combination is a direct infringement of the claims of the patent on the part and a contributory infringement
of claims of the patent on the combination...").
7. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994). The statute provides that "Whoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Id.
8. See Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that specific intent to encourage infringement is an
element). E.g., Fromberg, Inc. v. Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1963);
Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839-40 (M.D. Fla. 1976);
Zenith Labs. Inc., v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
9. For example, instruction and advertising activities on the part of the
seller of a product or providing instructions or directions as to infringing use,
can constitute active inducement. Taylor Engines, Inc. v. All Steel Engines,
Inc., 192 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1951). Design of an infringing item for another also may constitute active inducement. Id. Licensing others similarly
may constitute active inducement if the licensor provides instructions or plans
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before inducing liability can arise.l°
Section 271(c) defines the tort of contributory infringement."
Contributory infringement requires the sale of a component of a
patented machine, combination or composition, or a material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, which constitutes a material part of the invention." However, for this activity
to constitute contributory infringement, the contributory infringer
must know that the component, material or apparatus is specially
made or adapted for use in a patent-infringing device." Furthermore, the material, component or apparatus must not be a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use."' Contributory infringement can only occur if there
is direct infringement." The contributory infringer must have
known that the combination for which his component was designed had been patented and that its customer was not entitled to
practice the patent in issue. 6 However, this knowledge requirement can be satisfied in many ways."
II. THE BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF PURSUING PARALLEL
LITIGATION
Part II discusses how courts deal with those situations where
more than one patent lawsuit is ongoing among a patentee, its
competitor and the competitor's customers.
A

The "CustomerSuit"Exception to the First-FiledRule

Absent special circumstances, the first filed suit has priority
over a second filed suit in federal court." Typically, later-filed
enabling the licensee to practice the potential product or process, and if there
is some connection between the licensee and the act of infringement. Id.

10. Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994). The statute provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells a component of a patented machine,

manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of

the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.

Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S.

476, 498-99 (1964).

16. Id. at 488.
17. Id. at 488-90. For example, it can be satisfied by a notice of infringement.
18. William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177,
178 (2d Cir. 1969).

The John Marshall Law Review

[31:19

lawsuits are stayed pending the outcome of the first action. However, one situation commonly justifies a departure from the firstfiled rule of priority - the "customer suit" exception. The customer
suit exception is applied when "the first suit is filed against a customer who is simply a reseller of the accused goods, while the second suit is a declaratory action brought by the manufacturer" of
the goods against the patentee."' In this situation, the first-filed
suit against the reseller is likely to be stayed, while the manufacturer pursues the litigation against the patentee.
For example, in William Gluckin & Co. v. International
Playtex Corp., Playtex brought a patent infringement case against
Woolworth's in a Georgia federal district court alleging Woolworth's was selling a patented brassiere in its Gainsville, Georgia
store."0 The manufacturer of the alleged infringing brassiere,
Gluckin, brought a declaratory judgment suit in New York, its
principal place of business, against Playtex for non-infringement
and patent invalidity."' The district court stayed the first-filed suit
in Georgia under the customer suit exception." At the appellate
level, Playtex argued that there was no reason to stay the first suit
simply because the defendant is a customer of the manufacturing
infringer. 3 Playtex argued that 35 U.S.C. § 271 identifies selling
as an act of infringement such that Woolworth's was an infringer
of the patent every bit as much as Gluckin, the manufacturer.
Playtex asserted that there must be a finding of harassment or forum shopping before the first filed suit could be enjoined. 5 Nevertheless, the appellate court determined that the issuance of an injunction by the district court against continued prosecution of the

19. Kahn v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.2d 1078, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
The federal district courts, of course, have general authority to transfer actions, consolidate discovery and otherwise simplify logistics, with various
qualifications and limitations. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1407 (1994); FED. R. CIV. P.
42. A patentee who institutes contemporaneous lawsuits both against a competitor and against its customer (not merely a reseller) can expect a motion to
stay or transfer one of the cases to the same district in which the other case is
pending, with the ultimate goal of case consolidation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(permitting transfer to a different forum "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.. ."). Section 1404(a) is somewhat limited
in that transfer is authorized only to any district or division where the suit
"might have been brought." Id.; Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960).
A decision by a trial court on whether to stay or transfer a matter is committed to the court's sound discretion and tends to be very fact-specific. See generally E. HoRwITz AND L. HoRwiTZ, PATENT LITIGATION, PROCEDURE &
TACTICS § 4.02[2], at 4-10.2, et. seq. (1995).
20. 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969).
21. Id. at 178.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 179.
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first suit was not an abuse of discretion."6 The appellate court
stressed that trial courts have broad discretion in implementing
rules of judicial administration like the first-filed rule and the
"customer suit" exception.27
In Kahn v.General Motors Corp.," the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals considered when to apply the customer suit exception.29
Kahn filed suit against General Motors (GM) based on its manufacture and sale of stereo receivers." Motorola then filed suit
against Kahn arguing that certain integrated circuits Motorola
used in its stereo receivers did not infringe Kahn's patent as asserted in the first action.3" Motorola was labeled by the district
court as the manufacturer and GM was deemed a simple customer.32 The district court stayed the first action and an appeal
followed. 3 According to the appellate court, however, the Motorola
component did not infringe the patent-in-suit under § 271 (a), (b)
or (c).' Infringement occurred only when GM incorporated the circuits into receivers." The appellate court explained that "the customer suit exception is based on the manufacturer's presumed
greater interest in defending its actions against charges of patent
infringement; and to guard against the possibility of abuse.""
Consequently, GM was not a mere reselling customer so the customer suit exception did not apply.37 The appellate court then
applied
the first-filed rule38 and vacated the stay of the first-filed
39
suit.

26. Gluckin, 407 F.2d at 179.
27. Id.
28. 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
29. Id. at 1081-82.
30. Id. at 1078.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1081.
33. Id. at 1078.
34. Kahn, 889 F.2d at 1081.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1081.
37. Id. "Cases in which a customer suit exception has been held to favor
the forum of the second-filed action [were situations in which] the second action would resolve all charges against the customers in the stayed suit, including liability for damages." Id. By contrast, this judicial economy would not
obtain in the case under appeal. Id. at 1081-82. Also, the Federal Circuit
noted that decisions staying a customer action in favor of a subsequent suit
typically involved resellers or retailers where identical issues were presented,
or where the different customer defendants agreed to be bound by any injunction issued in the manufacturer case. Id. at 1082. GM had not agreed to
be so bound. Id.
38. Id. at 1082.
39. Id. at 1083.
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B. Preclusionof Suit Against Customers of an Already-Sued
Manufacturer
Over the years, courts have debated the circumstances under
which a lawsuit may be filed against a customer of an already-sued
manufacturer. Bechik Products, Inc. v. Flexible Products, Inc."'
was an appeal by a patentee from a preliminary injunction that
prohibited the patentee from suing any of the customers of the defendant manufacturer.4 1 Bechik, the patentee, accused Flexible of
making and selling Bechik's patented mattress handles."2 Bechik
accused another defendant, Crown, of contributory infringement
for using the handles in mattresses of its manufacture.'
The
manufacturer admitted financial responsibility for all possible
damage."
The patentee sent a notice threatening suit to at least one
Crown customer.'5 The trial court found that such notice was not
sent in bad faith and that there was nothing unfair about the notice." The appellate court characterized the letter as nothing more
than a fair warning to the customer of the potential financial liability it faced in the event that the accused infringing manufacturer was not financially able to satisfy a damage award."
The reviewing court explained that the "owner of a patent has
a right to threaten suits for infringement, provided he does so in
good faith."
Moreover, "[t]his is not a case in which effort was
made to harass or ruin a competitor's business on the basis of
claimed patent rights known to be groundless."' 9 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that the grant of an injunction during the pendancy of litigation involved several considerations.' Significantly, while the patentee has a statutory right
to protect its intellectual property by prosecuting suits against infringers, the injunction could be sustained if it did not substantially impair the patentee's rights under patent law and it operates
to prevent needless litigation.51 This, the court explained, "has
been an historic and traditional objective of equity. " 52
The appellate court then distinguished between the stay of
actions already brought and the preclusion of institution of new
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

225 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955).
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bechik, 225 F.2d at 605.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bechik, 225 F.2d at 606.
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actions.' The former seemingly involved less risk of impairment
to the rights of the patentee. For instance, an injunction against
new suits would create a change in the initial date for which damages could be recovered. ' However, the appellate court considered
this a remote risk because it believed the patentee could recover
sufficient damages from the manufacturing defendant to include
damages otherwise recoverable from the manufacturer's customers.' The appellate court therefore held that the injunction might
issue, but only on condition that the accused manufacturer furnish
a bond sufficient to cover damages resulting from its direct infringement and its customer's contributory infringement.'
On the other hand, American Chemical Paint Co. v.
Thompson Chemical Corp. 7 was a case in which a preliminary injunction precluding a patentee from commencing suit against customers of the accused manufacturer, pending determination of the
action against the manufacturer, was reversed on appeal." Here,
the alleged infringement consisted of the manufacture and sale of
materials embodying the patented invention." During the course
of discovery, the patentee learned that the accused manufacturer
had sold the materials to various dealers.m The patentee then filed
suit against two dealer customers of the manufacturing defendant.61 The manufacturer intervened in the two lawsuits, seeking
to stay those proceedings pending disposition of the first action. 2
It also moved in the original action to enjoin the patentee from
bringing any further actions pending resolution of the case on the
merits.'
In one of the subsequent customer suits, a stay was
granted.' In the other, however, it was denied." The trial court in
53. Id. at 606-07.
54. Id. at 607; 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1994). Postponement of suit would theoretically allow some infringing acts to become stale, i.e., to have occurred more
than six years before suit was filed.
55. Bechik, 225 F.2d at 607.
56. Id. In Signode Corp. v. Weld-Loc Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir.

1983), the court adopted a comparable rationale in a somewhat different context. Here, the patentee appealed the denial of a preliminary injunction
against further sales of the accused product. Id. at 1110. One of its arguments was that it would ultimately be entitled to injunctive relief against all
users of the infringing product. Id. at 1115. Ever increasing sales of the infringing tools, the patentee contended, would increase its litigation burden to
the point of irreparable harm. Id. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument because, if the patentee prevailed on the merits, the manufacturing in-

fringers "will be obliged to pay any lost profits due on these sales.. . ." Id.
57. 244 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1957).
58. Id. at 65, 67.
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 65-66.
62. Id. at 66.
63. American Chem. PaintCo., 244 F.2d at 66.
64. Id.
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the original action then issued an injunction against the commencement of new actions and the prosecution of the two customer
suits.66
At the outset, the appellate court considered the propriety of
the trial court granting an injunction on the same issue that al67
ready had been ruled upon by a court of "co-ordinate jurisdiction."
It determined that there are cases in which overruling an injunction is necessary to protect the initial court's power to act, but that
the instant case did not fit in this category."
Then the appellate court considered that part of the order
that enjoined the commencement of new infringement suits
against the manufacturer's customers. 9 It stated that "a patent
owner has a cause of action, separate and independent from that
against an infringing manufacturer, to recover profits and damages and to restrain one who resells a product, which he purchased
from an infringing manufacturer."7" The reviewing court emphasized that the right to bring such an action is sanctioned by statute
and should not be interfered with absent compelling reasons.7' It
recognized that an injunction precluding a patentee from commencing infringement suits against customers of the manufacturer
pending disposition of the initial litigation could operate to prevent
needless litigation without substantial impairment to the patentee's rights.72 However, unless the manufacturer was financially
able to respond in damages for any infringement for which it or its
customers might be held accountable, an injunction against customer suits could substantially impair the patentee's rights." The
district court in American Chemical Paint Co. had given the patentee the right, under the preliminary injunction, to show that the
manufacturer was financially unable to respond in damages.74 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not consider this to be
an acceptable substitute for a finding of financial ability because it
was not a present determination of financial responsibility, and it
placed the burden of proof on the wrong party, the patentee.75 The
injunction against filing additional suits against customers was
reversed.76

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 66-67.
69. American Chem. PaintCo., 244 F.2d at 67.
70. Id.
71. Id.

72. Id. (citing Bechik Products Inc. v. Flexible Products, Inc., 225 F.2d 603,
606 (2d Cir. 1955).
73. American Chem. PaintCo., 244 F.2d at 67.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit in Sunstrand Corp. v. American Brake
Shoe Co. also considered, inter alia, the propriety of an injunction
against future suits or charges of infringement by a patentee
against customers and users of products of the accused manufacturer. " The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals turned to Kerotest
ManufacturingCo. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.78 for guidance.7"
The court interpreted Kerotest to mean that trial courts have the
discretion to protect manufacturers from harassment of their customers." At a minimum, the court determined harassment or
probable harassment must be demonstrated by the manufacturer
before the patentee's right to sue customers and users should be
curtailed.81 The appellate court did not address the issue of
whether the manufacturer was capable of responding in damages.
In the absence of any showing that suit brought against customers
was in anything but good faith and for a legitimate purpose, the
injunction against future suits was reversed.8 2
Several conclusions can be drawn as to a patentee's right to
pursue parallel litigation against an infringing manufacturer and
the infringing manufacturer's customers. Consistent with the
general rule, a first-filed suit will have priority except where it is
against a customer who is simply a reseller of the accused goods, if
the manufacturer brings a second, declaratory judgment action.
The issue of whether an accused manufacturer's financial
ability to compensate the patentee for all damages sustained by
the manufacturer and its customers is a basis on which to enjoin
subsequent suits against the customer has not been addressed by
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. In the absence of a preliminary injunction issue, this would seem to be a reasonable accommodation of competing interests.
However, a different result may be appropriate when a patentee obtains or is seeking interim injunctive relief. The balance
of interests should shift from the above-described situations when
monetary damages are sought. An infringing manufacturer's customers should nbt have the right to continue business as usual if
interim injunctive relief is appropriate and if the patentee can post
the appropriate bond.
C. Estoppel to Relitigate
There is also a judicial limitation on the ability of a patentee
to sue for patent infringement once a federal court declares the
patent invalid. In Blonder-Tongue LaboratriesInc. v. University of
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

315 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1963).
342 U.S. 180 (1952).
Sunstrand,315 F.2d at 274.
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id. at 276-77.
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Illinois Foundation," the United States Supreme Court deter-

mined that a patent holder should not be able to sue on its patent
after the patent has been invalidated, with one exception.' The
patentee must be permitted to demonstrate, if it can, that it "did
not have a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue this claim the first time."' Not surprisingly,
very few lower court decisions after Blonder-Tongue have agreed
that 8 a patentee did not receive a full and fair opportunity to litigate.

This is a generalization of the hoary rule that a patent infringement action against a customer is barred if the vendor previously prevailed against the patentee because of invalidity or noninfringement of the patent."1
Collateral estoppel on patent validity is, however, a one-way
street. A judgment of patent invalidity binds a patent owner, but a
judgment of validity does not bind persons who were neither parties nor in privity with parties to the suit.8 Thus, a patentee who
prevails against a competitor infringer does not automatically prevail against the competitor's customer. Nevertheless, there is
some benefit to prior success. Courts will at least consider a prior
holding of validity or infringement as evidence. 8
III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PATENT DAMAGES
A patentee can in theory obtain multiple judgments against
its competitor and the competitor's customers. The patentee's
right to enforce each judgment, however, is limited by a doctrine

83. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
84. Id. at 348-50.
85. Id. at 333 (citing Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301
(D. Mass. (1960)).
86. See generally Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 712
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting patentee's argument that the prior determination of
invalidity by summary judgment was denial of full and fair opportunity to litigate); Westwood Chem., Inc. v. Molded Fiber Glass Body Co., 498 F.2d 1115,
1119-20 (6th Cir. 1974) (rejecting assertion that "false testimony" by accused
infringer amounted to a denial of full and fair opportunity to litigate). One of
the rare occasions in which Blonder-Tongue estoppel was not applied occurred
in Loctite Corp. v. UltrasealLtd., 209 U.S.P.Q. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1980). In that

case, a proceeding before the International Trade Commission was dismissed
based on the patent owner's express doubts as to validity. Id. at 1032. The
district court, in subsequent litigation between the parties, concluded that in
the absence of a contested hearing, the validity issue had not been fully and
fairly litigated at the administrative level. Id. at 1031.
87. Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907); MGA, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 827 F.2d 729, 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
88. Stevenson, 713 F.2d 705. See also Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673, 678
(10th Cir. 1971) (finding that it was "grossly inequitable to bind a party to a
judgment of validity rendered in an action against some other party.")
89. See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.02[2] (1995).
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known as the single recovery, or full compensation, rule.' The
rule as applied to patent litigation is simple: a patentee is entitled
to full compensation for related acts of infringement, but the patentee, like any tort victim, is not entitled to multiple recoveries for
the same injury. Courts in the United States have grappled with
implementation of the single recovery rule, and what constitutes
full compensation, for many years.
In order to appreciate the nuances and complexities involved
in such a determination, it is important to understand the basic
principles behind patent damages law. 35 U.S.C. § 284 provides:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the
court... [Tihe court may increase the damages up to three times
the amount found or assessed. 9'
This statute, enacted as part of the 1952 Patent Act, was intended to codify existing law.' Therefore, a brief review of the
evolution of patent damage laws is useful to its interpretation.
Section 4 of the Patent Act of 1790 allowed patentees to recover damages from infringers. 9 The Patent Act of 1793 changed
the patentee's recovery in that it specified "a sum, that shall be at
least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention."9' Thus, the price of a license became the measure of single
damages, and an infringer was required to "forfeit and pay to the
patentee" an amount which was three times that sum. 95 The form

90. The single recovery rule requires a party to include all past, present
and future claims against an adversary in one cause of action. Amy B. Blumenberg, Medical Monitoring Funds: The PeriodicPayment of Future Medical
Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 661,
661 (1992).
91. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).

92. Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377 U.S.
476, 505 n.20 (1964) (quoting H.R. Rep. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 29
(1952)). See Donner, BIC Leisure v. Windsurfmg: The Federal Circuit Catches
the "Big One" and Leaves the Supreme Court on Shore to Dry, 4 FED. CIR. BAR.
J. 167 (1994), for a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of § 284.
93. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 STAT. 111 (1790). "[E]very person so
offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee. .. such damages as shall
be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the
thing or things so devised, made, constructed, used, employed, or vended... "
Id.
94. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 STAT. 318 (Feb. 21, 1793).
95. Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488 (1853). The Court
noted, however, that experience has shown that "some inventions or discoveries had their chief value in a monopoly of use by the inventor, and not in a
sale of licenses, [thus,] the value of a license could not be made a universal
rule, as a measure of damages." Id.
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of damages was again changed in the Patent Act of 1800.'6 It
authorized a patentee to recover "a sum equal to three times the
actual damages sustained by such patentee.., from or by reason
of such offence, which sum shall and may be recovered, by action
of the case."97
The Patent Act of 1819 ushered in federal equity's involvement in patent litigation.98 Until then, a patentee only had the legal remedy of an action on the case, with the relief limited to an
award of damages." The Act of 1819 expanded a patentee's remedy to include a suit in equity for injunctive relief.'0 Under the
Act, courts of equity could order equitable accountings of the infringer's profits but not the recovery of the patentee's lost profits
or royalty.'°'
Congress' next change to damages was in the Patent Act of
By that Act, the jury in a court of law was to assess
1 8 3 6 ."2
"actual damages" for patent infringement.' 3 However, mandatory
trebling, which had continued in effect from the Patent Act of
1800, was repealed." Instead, courts were vested with the power
to award up to treble the amount of the actual damages, in their
discretion, as punitive damages."°5 Federal equity jurisdiction was
also continued into the Patent Act of 1836.1' 6
In 1870, Congress expanded the power of federal equity to include where appropriate the award of the patentee's damages as
well as the infringer's profit. Section 59 of the 1870 Act retained
"actual damages" as the standard that a jury could award in an
action at law.0 7 However, an infringer's profits still remained the
96. Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 STAT. 37 (1800).
97. Id. In Whittemore v. Cutter,Justice Story interpreted the "actual damages" provision of the Patent Act of 1800 to mean "such damages as the plaintiffs can actually prove and have in fact sustained, as contradistinguished to

mere imaginary or exemplary damages, which in personal torts are sometimes
given ....29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (D. Mass. 1813).
98. Patent Act of 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 STAT. 481-82 (1819).
99. CHISUM, supra note 89, at § 20.02[1][a]. Injunctive relief was only
available in state courts and when a federal court sat based on diversity of
citizenship. Id. at § 20.02[1][b].
100. Patent Act of 1819, ch. 19, § 1, 3 STAT. 481-82.
101. Id. See also Root v. Railway, 105 U.S. 189 (1882) (quoting the language

of the Patent Act of 1819 regarding equitable relief).
102. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 STAT. 117 (1836).
103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id. at § 14. See also Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 489 (1853)
(stating that the court's discretionary power to inflict punitive damages is
limited within the trebling of actual damages).
106. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 STAT. 117.
107. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 59, 15 STAT. 198 (1870).

[Tihe court shall have power, upon bill in equity filed by any party aggrieved, to grant injunctions according to the course and principles of
courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent,
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primary award for relief in a suit at equity while a patentee's
damages was the primary award in a suit in a court of law.'
One case that lent its imprimatur to our current scheme of
patent damages is Dowagiac Manufacturing.Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co.'9 It articulated a "reasonable royalty" damages option. The Court stated:
The plaintiff was clearly entitled to damages for the infringement.
If there had been an established royalty, the jury could have taken
that sum as a measure of damages. In the absence of such royalty,
and in the absence of proof of lost sales or injury by competition, the
only measure of damages was such sum as, under all the circumstances, would have been a reasonable royalty for the defendant to
have paid. This amount was the province of the jury to determine.
In so doing, they did not make a contract for the parties, but found a
measure of damages.110
In 1946, Congress substantially altered the equitable relief
provisions of the patent statute.'
Significantly, Congress eliminated the right to an accounting for an infringer's profits in courts
of equity and changed the equitable damages remedy to "general
damages which shall be due compensation for making, using or
selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor...

,,112

The legislative history of the 1946 Act manifested Con-

gress' concern with the difficulties that had plagued the courts in
apportioning from the infringer's profits, for recovery by the patentee, that portion attributable to the claimed invention. The accounting had become protracted, expensive and unworkable."' At
on such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a decree
being rendered in any such case for an infringement, the complainant
shall be entitled to recover, in addition to the profits to be accounted for
by the defendant, the damages the complainant has sustained thereby
... and the court shall have the same powers to increase the same in its
discretion that are given by this act to increase the damages found by
verdicts in actions upon the case ....
Id. at § 55. See also Marsh v. Seymour, 97 U.S. 348, 360 (1878) (holding that
"[diamages of a compensatory character may be allowed to a complainant in
an equity suit, where it appears that the business of the infringer was so improvidently conducted that it did not yield any substantial profits, as in the
case before the court"); Root v. Railway, 105 U.S. 189 (1882) (quoting the language of the Patent Act of 1870).
108. Burdell v. Denig, 92 U.S. 716, 719-20 (1876).
109. 235 U.S. 641 (1915).
110. Id. at 649 (citing Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585,
587 (9th Cir. 1894)).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1994)).
112. Id. See also Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
Inc., 377 U.S. 476, 505-06 (1964).
113. "[Ilt is absolutely impossible to apportion the profits due to the invention, those being the only profits to which the patentee is entitled ....

The

only sound principle is to have the plaintiff recover the damages he can
prove." H.R. Rep., No. 1587, 79th Cong., 1, at 3 (1946). See also, S.Rep., No.
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the same time, Congress tried to make sure that patent owners
would be completely compensated."" In enacting § 284 in its present form in 1952, Congress reportedly consolidated § 67 and § 70 of
the 1946 code, with changes to the language."5
IV. DAMAGES FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT

Under the Patent Act of 1952, recoverable damages in patent
infringement litigation have currently evolved into two general
species: the patentee's lost profits and royalty-based damages." 6
Both types of damages are discussed below.
A. Lost Profits
A court will infer that the patentee's lost sales are equal in
quantity to the infringing sales if the patentee proves: (1) demand
for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes; and (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to
exploit the demand."7 The patentee also needs to prove the
amount of his lost profit."8 Many decisions of the Federal Circuit
apply this methodology." 9
1503, 79th Cong., 2 (1946).
114. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983).
115. Aro, 377 U.S. at 505 n.20.
116. Hartness Intl, Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1112 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
117. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156
(6th Cir. 1978).
118. See BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfmg Intl, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (explaining that in order to recover lost profits, a patent owner
must prove a causal relation between the infringement and lost profits); BioRad Labs., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
(stating that a patent owner must show that it would have made sales but for
the infringing activity).
119. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (stating that evidence showing a reasonable probability that the
patent owner would have made sales is sufficient to prove lost profits); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(stating that lost profit awards require a showing that the patent owner would
have made the sales but for the infringement). In Bio-Rad Laboratories,the
Federal Circuit indicated that while Panduit articulates a permissible way to
establish lost profits, it does not establish the only way to determine entitlement to lost profits. 739 F.2d at 616. The presence or absence of acceptable
non-infringing substitutes can be shown in a variety of ways. E.g., Lam, Inc.
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Marsh-McBirney, Inc.
v. Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The simplest case
arises when the patent owner and the infringer are the only suppliers to the
relevant market. E.g., Lam, 718 F.2d 1056; Marsh-McBirney, 882 F.2d 498.
When the relevant market holds but those two competitors, the patentee most
likely would have made the sales "but for" the infringing product. Lam, 718
F.2d at 1065; Marsh-McBirney, 882 F.2d at 505. The patentee has more difficulty showing causation when the relevant market holds more than two competitors. The Federal Circuit has also reviewed the following types of evi-
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When the patentee and infringer are not sole competitors in a
relevant market, proof of a sale by the patentee "but for" the infringing product can be difficult. In these circumstances, the Federal Circuit has awarded pro rata lost profits damages based on a
"market share" theory. State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. is the seminal case on market share lost profits damages. 20 Mor-Flo infringed a patented method of insulating water
heaters with foam.1 21 State Industries held approximately 40% of
the relevant nationwide market. 12 2 The district court awarded
State lost profits on 40% of the infringing sales by Mor-Flo and a
reasonable royalty of 3% on the other 60% of the infringer's
sales."' The court of appeals affirmed the decision on appeal."
The federal court stated that since State had sufficient marketing
and manufacturing capabilities to meet its market share of the
demand, "it is eminently reasonable for the district court to infer
that State could have sold its market share
of Mor-Flo's infringing
12
sales wherever the opportunity occurred."

The recent Federal Circuit opinion in BIC Leisure Products,
Inc. v. Windsurfing International,Inc. qualified the market share
theory of lost profits.2 The appellate court first reiterated that
"[to recover lost profits as opposed to royalties, a patent owner
must prove a causal relation between the infringement and its loss
of profits.' 7 The patent owner must prove that "but for" the infringement, it would have made the infringer's sales." 8 The evidence when determining what constitutes acceptable substitutes: (1) whether
the patent owner lost sales to an infringer under a bidding system; (2)
whether the patent owner's sales or prices fell and rose contemporaneously
with the infringer's entry and departure from the market; and (3) whether the
infringer was either a former customer of the patent owner or a supplier to
such former customer. CHISUM, supra note 89, at §§ 20.03[1][a][iv][B]-[D].
120. 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 1575.
122. Id. at 1576.
123. Id. at 1575.
124. Id. at 1582.
125. Id. at 1579. The same "market share" approach is seen in King Instrument Corp. v. Perego, 737 F. Supp. 1227, 1241-42 (D. Mass. 1990). The
appellate court qualified the State Industries holding in Slimfold Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Industries. Inc., 932 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The
patentee asserted that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing to
award lost profits based on market share. The appellate court explained that
there was a "critical difference" between State Industries and the present case
in that State Industries held the grant of lost profits based on market share
was not an abuse of discretion. The court then announced, "[h]owever, that
holding does not mean that the contrary is true, i.e. that the failure to award
lost profits based on market share would constitute an abuse of discretion.
We hold that such a failure to award lost profits in the present case was not
an abuse of discretion." Id. at 1458.
126. 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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dence at trial revealed that demand for sailboards (to which the
patent related) was relatively elastic.12 9 The record further showed
that the sailboard market's entry level, where the accused infringer competed, was particularly sensitive to price disparities.130
The infringer's sailboards cost $350 while the patentee's boards
were priced around $600.3" The court explained that without the
infringer in the market, its customers would likely have bought
boards in the same price range"3 The patentee failed to show that
the infringer's customers would have purchased from the patentee
in proportion with the patentee's market share. 3 3 The court refused to infer this fact in light of what occurred in State Industries.
BIC Leisure distinguished its holding from the holding in
3 for lost
State Industries. The court opined that the Panduit test"
profits operates under an inherent assumption that the patent
owner and the infringer sell products sufficiently similar to compete against each other in the same market segment." 5 If the
products of the patentee and the infringer are not substitutes in a
competitive market, then the first two factors of the Panduit test
are not met, and lost profits are not recoverable.'36 The opinion
emphasized that a patent owner may substitute proof of its market
share for proof of the absence of acceptable substitutes, but only
when the patent owner and the infringer compete in the same
market. 137
When the patent in question covers only a part of the commercial device sold or used by the patent owner or infringer, the
fact finder must determine whether lost profits should be based
only on the patented component or on the system as a whole. This
issue has 13long been one of the most complex areas of patent damages law.

1

In Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp.,
the patented invention was. an automatic rewinder to roll consumer goods from a paper web under high tension. 3 ' The mechanism for the high-speed manufacture of paper rolls included several components, only one of which - the rewinder - incorporated

the claimed invention.140 Peripheral equipment included a stand to
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. BIC Leisure, 1 F.3d at 1218.
133. Id.
134. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
135. BIC Leisure, 1 F.3d at 1218.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1219.
138. 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.02[3] (1997).

139. 745 F.2d 11, 23 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
140. Id. at 13-14.
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support a large roll of paper, a core loader to supply pasteboard
cores to the patented rewinder, an embosser to provide a special
textured surface on the paper and a tail seeker to seal the paper's
trailing end to the consumer-sized roll."' None of the auxiliary
units were integral parts of the rewinder."' Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit explained that the deciding factor is whether
"normally the patentee (or its licensee) can anticipate sale of such
unpatented components as well as of the patented" ones. 4 1 If in all
reasonable probability the patent owner would have made the
sales which the infringer has made, what the patent owner, in reasonable probability, would have netted from the sales denied to
him is the measure of his loss, and the infringer is liable for that
amount.'" Whether a patentee could anticipate additional income
from the auxiliary parts was a question of fact, which the reviewing court would not disturb because the lower court's finding was
not clearly erroneous."'
In Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co.,' 46 the
court noted:
[Iun appropriate circumstances, the patentee may prove the extent
of its lost profits by the "entire market value rule". . based on a
showing that the patentee could reasonably anticipate the sale of
the unpatented components together with the patented components
risks,
.... Other factors, such as development costs and business
147
may be taken into account if the circumstances warrant.
In State Industries,Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries,Inc., the appellate court affirmed an award by the district court of lost profits
based on the patentee's profit margin on the sale of water heaters,
although the patent was on a method of adding foam insulation to
water heaters. 148 The court explained that the "entire market
value rule... permits recovery of damages based on the value of
the patthe entire apparatus containing several features, where
49
ent-related feature is the basis for customer demand."
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Company, Inc. is the most recent
damages pronouncement from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals." Rite-Hite sued the Kelley Company for infringement of a
patented mechanism that secured trucks to loading docks during

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
court
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PaperConvertingMachine, 745 F.2d at 23.
836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1327 (citations omitted). The case was remanded for the trial
to consider all relevant evidence. Id. at 1329.
883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1580.
56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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the loading or unloading process."' The district court found infringement and awarded Rite-Hite the wholesale profits that the
manufacturer patentee would have made on lost sales of its competing product. 5 ' The competing product, though, did not practice
the patent-in-suit. The Federal Circuit, in an en banc decision,
agreed that Rite-Hite was entitled to lost profits in connection with
lost sales of its competing, unpatented product.'53 The appellate
court stated that a patentee must prove "but for" causation for lost
profits and also that the lost sales were "foreseeable" or proximately caused by the infringement, as those terms are traditionally defined."M The majority concluded that the lost sales of the
unpatented product were foreseeable because Rite-Hite's unpatented5 product was in direct competition with the infringer's product.1

In Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit affirmed the use of the entire
market rule to determine whether unpatented components sold
with a patented apparatus should be included in the damages calculation of lost profits. The court, though, restricted application of
the rule to situations in which the patented and unpatented components were analogous to a single functioning unit. This holding
adds an additional element to Paper Converting Machine's main
query of whether a patentee can reasonably anticipate sale of the
unpatented components as well as the patented components.'5
Thus, under Rite-Hite one must first decide the single functioning
unit rule is applicable before even applying the underlying question of reasonable anticipation.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 1542.
Id. at 1543.
Id.
Id. at 1558, 1569.
Id. at 1555. A dissenting opinion by Judge Nies disagreed with this

proposition. Id. at 1556. The dissent rejected the foreseeability test and
stated that the property rights of a patentee do not extend to its market in
goods unprotected by the litigated patent. Id. at 1569. Thus, the dissent argued, diversion of sales of an unpatented product is not an injury to the pat-

entee's property rights and cannot constitute legal injury for which lost profits
may be awarded. Id. at 1569-70. See also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego,
65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming the district court award of lost profits
from sales of unpatented competing product).
156. The Federal Circuit in Rite-Hite tried to reconcile its holding to Paper
Converting by stating:
[W]e may have appeared to expand the rule when we emphasized the
financial and marketing dependence of the unpatented component on
the patented component. In Paper Converting, however, the rule was
applied to allow recovery of profits on the unpatented components only
because all the components together were considered to be parts of a
single assembly. The references to "financial and marketing dependence" and "reasonable probability" were made in the context of the facts
of the case and did not separate the rule from its traditional moorings.
56 F.3d at 1550.
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B. Damages Based on Royalties
A patent owner may either recover damages based on an established royalty rate or if there is no established rate, on a
"reasonable" royalty rate. An established rate is based on prior actual licenses for acts comparable to those engaged in by the infringer without authority. The Supreme Court stated the factors
for proving an established royalty rate over a century ago:
It is undoubtedly true that where there has been such a number of
sales by a patentee of licenses to make, use, and sell his patents as
to establish a regular price for a license, that price may be taken as
a measure of damages against infringers... In order that a royalty
may be accepted as a measure of damages against an infringer, who
is a stranger to the license establishing it, it must be paid or secured before the infringement complained of; it must be paid by
such a number of persons as to indicate a general acquiescence in
its reasonableness by those who have occasion to use the invention;
157
and it must be uniform at the places where licenses are issued.
A "reasonable" royalty is one which a willing licensor and
willing licensee would arrive at in a hypothetical negotiation at the
time infringement starts, assuming the patent to be valid and
having available all information relevant to the determination of a

fair royalty. Georgia-PacificCorp. v. United States Plywood Corp.
lists fifteen factors to consider in determining the reasonable royalty."' The Federal Circuit has cited Georgia-Pacific with ap157. Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165 (1889).
158. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The factors are as follows:
(1) The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patentin-suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty; (2) the rates
paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent-in-suit; (3) the nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or nonexclusive, or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with
respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold; (4) the licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly; (5)
the commercial relationship between the licensor and the licensee, such
as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line
of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter; (6) the effect of
selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee, the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items, and the extent of such derivative
or convoyed sales; (7) the duration of the patent and the term of the license; (8) the established profitability of the product made under the
patent, its commercial success and its current popularity; (9) the utility
and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if
any, that had been used for working out similar results; (10) the nature
of the patented invention, the character of the commercial embodiment
of it as owned and produced by the licensor, and the benefits to those

who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which the infringer has
made use of the invention, and any evidence probative of the value of
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proval.
These factors generally fall into two groups. The first
group relates to the specific and general market conditions in the
pertinent industry. The second group relates to the anticipated
profitability of the product made, used or sold by the infringer and
covered by the patent.
In Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
award to Rite-Hite of reasonable royalties based on the patentee's
profits rather than on the infringer's profits.' 60 The district court
reasoned that Rite-Hite owned a pioneer patent and had consistently followed a practice of exploiting its own patents, rather than
licensing them. 6 ' The Federal Circuit stated that the royalty may
be based on an established royalty or on the results of hypothetical
negotiations between the plaintiff and defendant. 162 The appellate
court agreed that it was not unreasonable for the trial court to find
that an unwilling patentee would only license for one-half its expected lost profits and that such an amount was a reasonable royalty. 6 The fact that the award was not based on the infringer's
profits did not make it an unreasonable award.'"
V. THE EBB AND FLOW OF "FULL COMPENSATION"
A. Evolution of the Single Recovery Rule
To some extent, the courts have explored the ramifications of
full compensation on subsequent suits by a patentee. Several
cases from the first century of American patent jurisprudence supthat use; (12) the portion of the profit or the selling price that may be
customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions; (13) the portion
of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,
business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer; (14) the opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) the
royalty that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon at the time the infringement began,
if both had reasonably and voluntarily been trying to reach an agreement.
Id.
159. See, e.g., Smithkine Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Georgia-Pacificwith approval); Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing the fifteen factors set forth in Georgia-Pacific).
160. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1555.
161. Id. at 1552-53.
162. Id. at 1554.
163. Id. at 1555.
164. Id. at 1576-77. Judge Nies, again in the dissent, states that "a reasonable royalty requires a balancing of the interests of the parties" and that "it is
simply beyond reality to infer that the management for the five hundred employee-owners of Kelley would have negotiated a royalty which, it was evident
at the time, would destroy their business and jobs." Id. at 1576-77.
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ported the rule that:
[after a] patentee has already received full compensation [from a
competitor] in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had
sold the patented articles himself .. the infringing articles so sold
may be used by the vendees thereof free from any further claim of
the patentee, or, in other words, that the vendees under such circumstances acquire an implied license to use them. 1'
This rule changed in 1884 after the Supreme Court decided
Birdsell v. Shaliol.'6 The facts from Birdsell are instructive.
Birdsell was the inventor and the patentee of an improvement in
machines for threshing and hulling clover-seed.'67 He had granted
to the Birdsell Manufacturing Company an exclusive oral license
to make, vend and use his invention.'" Birdsell had brought a
prior suit against the Ashland Machine Company. 16 Birdsell
Manufacturing Company was not a party in that prior suit, but
helped fund it. 7 ° The court determined that Ashland had infringed. The court in the prior suit issued a permanent injunction
and referred the case to a master for damages. 7' The master concluded that Ashland had made no profits for which it should account and that, if any damages had been sustained, they had been
sustained by non-party Birdsell Manufacturing Company. 7' Accordingly, Birdsell (the plaintiff) was entitled to recover only $1.00,
as nominal damages.'
Birdsell and Birdsell Manufacturing Company then sued
Ashland's customers Shaliol and Feikert for their use of one of the
machines manufactured by the Ashland Machine Company."'
Shaliol analogized his situation to the "first sale" doctrine.'75 Under that doctrine, once a patentee sells a patented item, the purchaser has the right to make, use and resell that item without further obligation to the patentee. 7 ' Similarly, under that doctrine
the patentee of the patented machine is deemed to treat machines
sold by the licensee under authority of his license in comparable

165. De Laski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co. v. Empire Rubber & Tire
Co., 239 F. 139, 143 (D.N.J. 1916) (citations omitted).
166. 112 U.S. 485, 487 (1884). See also United States Printing Co. v. American Playing-Card Co., 70 F. 50, 51 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1895) (explaining that
cases to the contrary "are virtually overruled by" Birdsell.)
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Prior to 1946, a patentee could recover an infringer's lost profits and
any damages suffered by the patentee. See supra Part IV.
173. Birdsell, 112 U.S. at 485-86.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 487.
176. Id.
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fashion to a sale.'77 In both instances, all claims of the patentee for
the use of such machines are exhausted. The lower court held that
because of the final decree in the suit against manufacturer Ashland, and the recovery in payment of even $1.00 in nominal damages, both Birdsell and Birdsell Manufacturing Company were estopped to maintain the customer suit. 7 '
In contrast, the Supreme Court did not find this analogy dispositive. It explained that an infringer does not, by paying damages for making and using a machine in infringement of a patent,
acquire any right itself to the future use of the machine.'79 The
Court observed that in addition to the payment of damages for
past infringement, an infringer may be restrained by injunction
from further use. 80 Similarly, one who pays damages for selling a
machine in infringement of a patent does not acquire for itself or
its vendee any right to use that machine.'
The Supreme Court referred to an analogous English lawsuit
brought by a patentee against both the manufacturer and the
user.'82 The English patentee asked for an injunction against each,
an accounting for profits against the manufacturer and for damages against the user. 8 The English customer asserted that the
patentee was not entitled to both damages against it and an accounting against the manufacturer.'
Furthermore, the user argued that the patentee could not have an accounting against the
manufacturer without in effect ratifying the sale to the user." Accordingly, it was urged, if the patentee adopted the sale by obtaining the manufacturer's profits, the patentee had no right to any
additional recovery from the purchaser.'
The English Vice Chancellor rejected this argument while observing that, "it has never, I
think, been held in this court that an account[ing], directed
against a manufacturer of a patented article, licenses the use of
that article in the hands of all the purchasers."'
So long as the
article is used, the Vice Chancellor opined, there is continuing
damage."'
The Supreme Court then conceptualized its view about recovery in sequential vendor-vendee patent cases as follows:
If one person is... exempt from being sued for damages for using
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 488.
Id. at 486.
Birdsell, 112 U.S. at 487.
Id.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Birdsell, 112 U.S. at 488.
Id.
Id. (citing Penn v. Bibby, L.R. 3 Eq. 308; S.C. 15 Weekly Report 192).
Id.
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the same machine for the making and selling of which damages
have been recovered against and paid by another person, it can only
be when actual damages have been paid, and upon the theory that
the plaintiff has been deprived of the same property by the acts of
two wrong-doers, and has received full compensation from one of
them.1 9
Under United States law, the Supreme Court observed, judgment against one joint trespasser, without full satisfaction, is no
bar to a suit against another for the same trespass."9 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court held that a judgment for nominal damages
against one wrongdoer does not bar a suit against another for a
continuance of the wrong."'
Tuttle v. Matthews was one of the first cases decided after
Birdsell that presents the issue of making the patentee whole,
while providing only a single recovery for the injury. 92 In this
case, the court first entered a decree that the patents in issue were
valid and infringed by harrows made and sold by the defendant. 93
Then the matter proceeded to an accounting.19 While that hearing
was pending, the infringer learned that the patentee was collecting money from the users of the infringing harrows for which an
accounting was in process. 91 The infringing manufacturer sought
an injunction restraining the patentee from interfering with the
infringer's customers.1 " This, the court declined to do.1 97 At the

outset, the court explained that the chief value of many patented
machines is in their use. 98 It observed that the right to make, use

189. Id. at 488-89.
190. Id. at 489.
191. Birdsell, 112 U.S. at 489. In Stutz v. Armstrong, 25 F. 147 (C.C.W.P.A.
1885), the court considered an appeal from a master's report on damages. The
accused infringer argued that damages based on a fixed license fee should be
apportioned because the enforced payment would not confer upon it the right
to further use the infringing machine. Id. at 148. The court rejected this argument stating:
But such is not my understanding of the law. I think the true doctrine,
and one reconciling any seeming inconsistencies in the decisions, is this:
That while the patentee may, if he choose, confine himself to a recovery
for past infringement, and insist that the further use of the infringing
machine be enjoined, yet if he elect as his measure of damages the full
license fee established by himself, the payment thereof operates to vest
in the defendant the right to use the machine during the term of the
patent, or until that particular machine is worn out.
Id.
192. 28 F. 98 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1886).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 99.
198. Tuttle, 28 F. at 98.
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and sell were independent rights.' 99 Recovery by the patentee for
one or more of those rights should not necessarily dedicate the machine to the public for unfettered use "with impunity."2°°
Another relevant case from the Birdsell era is United States
Printing Co. v. American Playing Card Co.2"' Here, the patentee
sued a printing company which was using a machine accused of
infringement for printing playing cards. 2 The patentee had previously sued the manufacturer of the machine and settled.2 °3 The
manufacturer asserted the settlement as a defense, albeit unsuccessfully."' The court noted a distinction between settlement and
a judgment for damages for past infringement on the one hand,
and an award of profits on the other hand stating:
Where a patentee takes a decree for profits against a manufacturing
infringer, he thereby sets the manufactured machine free .... In
such cases, the profits of the infringer are full compensation to the
complainant for the wrong done him by the unauthorized manufacture and sale of the infringing machine; but, where there is merely
a settlement of judgment for damages, it is only for damages in the
past, and has no relation to the future. 205
A similar issue was considered in De Laski & Thropp Circular
Woven Tire Co. v. Empire Rubber & Tire Co.2"6 Again, the patentee
first sued a manufacturer for infringement. 20 That case was settled and the patentee decided to sue one of the manufacturer's customers for infringement by use.00 That prior settlement was asserted as a defense.' The district court observed that the question
of whether the stipulation released not only the manufacturer, but
also its customer needed to be answered by the terms of the stipulation itself.2 0 The trial court concluded that the stipulation was
only intended to cover claims asserted against the manufacturer,
for infringements in making and selling the machine. 21' Hence, the
money paid under the stipulation was not in satisfaction of the
injury subsequently complained of use.2 2 The trial court observed
that even if the patentee had received full compensation for the
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. 70 F. 50 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1895).
202. Id. at 51.
203. Id. at 52.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 53. Recall that recovery of an infringer's profits was eliminated
as a remedy in 1946. See supra Part IV.
206. 239 F. 139 (D.C.D.N.J. 1916).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 141.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 142.
212. De Laski, 239 F. at 142.
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damages it sustained to the same extent as if it had manufactured
and 1supplied the customer being sued, this was hot a bar to re2
lief. 1
Nevertheless, the court was sensitive about awarding a double recovery. The district court explained that the patentee could
not be held to have received full compensation in the first suit,
unless it would have been entitled to recover from the manufacturer infringer "all that it could presumably recover by way of
damages from the" customer in the second suit.2" 4 The evidence
showed that the infringer's customer would not have used the patented machines even if it had not acquired the infringing machines.21 Accordingly, the district court concluded that the recovery in the first case could not have included compensation for use
by the infringer's customer.21 The court also concluded that the
patentee, if it so elected, was entitled to recover profits from the
customer, irrespective of the recovery of damages from the manufacturer, and to an injunction against the further use of the infringing machines.2"7
Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Deere & Webber Co. was an-

other customer suit in which was interposed the defense of recovery by the patentee in satisfaction of a judgment against the
manufacturer of the infringing drills.21 8 The court considered
Birdsell and its progeny and rejected the defense.21 1 "The fact that
there was a recovery against the manufacturer for profits in making the article complained of as an infringement does not prevent
the patentee from proceeding against the manufacturer's vendee
for an accounting, if he had made a profit, or for damages, or for an
injunction."' °
The United States Supreme Court returned to this area of law
in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson.2

Wilson successfully sued the Union

Tool Company for infringement of a patent for underreamers.'
He obtained a permanent injunction and the right to an accounting.2 The writ of injunction forbade the manufacture and sale,
not only of infringing machines, but also of parts or elements that
might be used in combination to effect infringement.2 The pat213. Id. at 143.
214. Id. at 144-45.
215. Id. at 146.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 284 F. 331 (8th Cir. 1922).
219. Id. at 334-50.
220. Id. at 335. The court then considered the distinction between recovery
for profits and for damages, a range of remedies which no longer exists. Id.
221. 259 U.S. 107 (1922).
222. Id. at 108.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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entee later sought to have the Union Tool Company held in contempt for violating the permanent injunction.2 The district court
found that after the injunction, the Union Tool Company sold
spare parts to be used with the machines sold by the company
prior to the injunction.22 The Supreme Court explained the issue
as follows:
The interlocutory decree awards to Wilson, among other things,
compensation by way of damages and profits, for employing the invention in any machine sold prior to the service of the injunction. A
patentee, in demanding and receiving full compensation for the
wrongful use of his invention in devices made and sold by a manufacturer adopts the sales as though made by himself, and therefore
necessarily licenses the use of the devices, and frees them from the
monopoly of the patent. The license continues during the life of the
machine; it does not end when repairs become necessary.227
Therefore, Union Tool Company argued that the sale of parts
was licensed and not a violation of the injunction.m This argument, in fact, prevailed in the district court.22' It did not succeed at
the Supreme Court.23 0 Wilson had not yet received any compensation for the infringement. 231 Accordingly, implied license to use the
spare parts in these machines existed.3 2 Since such use constituted an infringement, the sale of the spare parts also violated the
injunction. 233 A finding of contempt by the court of appeals was affirmed.'
Directoplate Corp. v. Huebner-Bleistein Patents Co. was an
appeal from an order of the trial court denying an infringing competitor's request that the patentee be enjoined from prosecuting
suits against the infringer's customers.3
There had been a first
suit, in which the patentee prevailed against the manufacturer on
several, if not all, of the asserted patents.3
Then the patentee
filed three separate suits against customers of the manufacturing
infringer, charging infringement by use. 37 On appeal, the court
considered whether the patentee could maintain a suit against the
infringer's customers and recover for infringement because of the
use of the same devices for which the patentee already recovered
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 109.
Id.
Union Tool, 259 U.S. at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Union Tool, 259 U.S. at 114.
Id.
44 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1930).
Id.
Id.
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from the manufacturer.'
Both parties cited the Birdsell opinion.
Without mentioning Wilson, the appellate court concluded that
Birdsell was authority for the proposition that suits may be maintained against users despite prior recovery.2 9
Egry Register Co. v. StandardRegister Co.2 0 involved a manufacturer who directly infringed by making and selling infringing
machines and was also found to contributorily infringe by selling
special supplies for the machines.2" The appellate court first concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to profits, but only to a
reasonable royalty as the measure of damages. 242 The court explained that the reasonable royalty measure of recovery adopted
the fiction that a license is granted when infringement begins.2
In effect, it explained, the judgment "creates and applies retrospectively a compulsory license. " ' Finally, the reviewing court
held that after adoption of the reasonable royalty basis of recovery,
"the whole structure of subsequent contributory infringement falls,
because the theory that the users of the devices were infringing
the patent has been rejected and the theory of a lawful and
24 noninfringing use flowing from a license has been substituted." M
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co. 6
involved a variation of the typical customer suit situation. The
patentee filed a first suit against the competitor's New York sales
subsidiary."' Validity and infringement were established. Then,
in the accounting phase, the patentee unsuccessfully sought to add
the manufacturing competitor as a co-defendant, after which it
brought a second suit against the manufacturer." The first suit
proceeded to a final decree on the accounting. 9 The court
awarded the patentee a reasonable royalty on the tires sold by the
subsidiary.'
In the second case, the patentee sought to recover the manufacturer's profits on tires sold to its New York subsidiary, even
though a reasonable royalty damage had been awarded and paid
in the prior action." The appellate court noted that the amount
awarded in the prior case actually exceeded what the patentee
238. Id.
239. Id.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

23 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1928).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
95 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1937).
Id. at 980.
Id.
Id.

250. Id.
251. Id.
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would have recovered if it had been successful in joining the parent company as a party for purposes of accounting for profit.'m The
court believed that- in the prior case the reasonable royalty had
been based upon the entire channel of production from wrongful
manufacture and sale to the subsidiary to sale by the subsidiary to
the public. 2' The subsidiary purchaser was sued first and it paid a
reasonable royalty for the manufacture and all sales. As a result,
the court deemed the competitor's manufacture and sale to its
subsidiary to have been licensed from the beginning."'
Wagner Sign Service, Inc. v. Midwest News Reel Theatres, Inc.
presented another factual variation on the application of the single
recovery rule."' Here, the issue concerned the rights of the patentee after judgment but before payment.' The Wagner appellate
decision had been preceded by a case that found Adler had infringed the Wagner patent by the manufacture and sale of certain
letter sign equipment."' Adler appealed this finding of liability
and the court granted a supersedeas upon the posting of a bond,
which Adler furnished.2 " While the appeal was pending on liability, the first case continued before a special master to report an account of damages and lost profits.' As of the time of the appeal in
the second action, the accounting had not yet been completed.6
The second suit was filed against one of Adler's customers. 26' The
defendant in the second suit had no connection with, or interest in,
the equipment in controversy, other than that of a user. 2' The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the user.263
The defendant customer argued on appeal that there was no
valid basis for the injunction because it had purchased the equipment from Adler who was required to account to Wagner for all
profits and damages and had furnished an appropriate bond. 2"
Wagner did not exact a royalty from its customers; the company
derived all profits from manufacture and sale. 26 5 The patentee ar252. Goodyear,95 F.2d at 983.
253. Id. at 984. The court discussed the alternative, noting that if that had
been the case, "[p]rofits earned by the parent company's sales to its subsidiary
or even damages, if any, suffered by plaintiff by reason of manufacture and
such sales, might then have been recoverable... The subsidiary's wrongdoing would be separate and distinct from that of the parent company." Id.
254. Id.
255. 119 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1941).
256. Id. at 930.
257. Id. at 929.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Wagner, 119 F.2d at 929.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 930.
265. Id.
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gued that it had not yet been compensated by recovery and, therefore, was entitled to proceed by injunction against the defendant,
as purchaser from Adler and user.'
The court started with "the
generally accepted doctrine that where a patentee has been fully
compensated by an infringing manufacturer for the manufacture
and sale of the infringing device, the patentee has no recourse
against a customer of such infringing manufacturer who is solely a
user of such device."" 7 According to the appellate court, the real
question was whether the protection afforded to the patentee by
the supersedeas bond should be treated in lieu of actual compensation paid by Adler.26 If so, the patentee should not be permitted
to maintain the second customer action. According to the appellate court, a supersedeas bond that such profits and damages
would be paid when ascertained had assured the patentee.2" The
patentee, having elected to obtain a judgment for all profits and
damages that it could prove against the manufacturer and having
assurance in the form of a bond that such judgment would be satisfied, "is in no position to complain of the mere use of the device
by the defendant."270 The preliminary injunction was reversed.2 7'
B. Application of Single Recovery Rule Under PatentAct of 1952
After the passage of the Patent Act of 1952, the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the single compensation issue in Aro ManufacturingCo., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., Inc.7 2 There, the Supreme Court considered whether a contributory infringer could avoid damages because of payment by a
direct infringer. 273 Although Aro did not involve a suppliercustomer relationship, the case is relevant for its reasoning.
Ford Motor Company was found to infringe a patent on a
combination convertible top structure by including the combination in several model years without authority. 27 4 Ford and the patentee entered into a settlement agreement by which Ford, its dealers, customers and users of its product were released from liability
for infringement arising out of manufacture, use, or sale of cars
made prior to the year in which settlement was effectuated.'75 The
266. Id.
267. Wagner, 119 F.2d at 930.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 932. By contrast, in TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., 722
F.2d 1261, 1270 (6th Cir. 1983), the appellate court distinguished Wagner on
the grounds that bond posted by TWM of $5000 was insufficient to cover the
expected award from the accounting.
271. Wagner, 119 F.2d at 932.
272. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
273. Id. at 481.
274. Id. at 478-79.
275. Id. at 482 n.4.
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release expressly excluded "replacement top fabrics," as to which
Ford 76was granted a license to make and sell for a specified roy2
alty.
The patentee then sued Aro Manufacturing Company for contributory infringement because it made and sold replacement tops
especially designed for use in Ford automobiles.2 77 Aro asserted
the release as a defense.27 The patentee relied on Birdsell and Union Tool. The Supreme Court disagreed with the patentee, stating
that:
Birdsell allowed the patentee to hold one infringer liable for use of
the patented machines after obtaining a judgment against another
infringer for the manufacture and sale of the same machines; Union
Tool held infringement to exist where the defendant, after being
held liable for the manufacture and sale of certain infringing machines, sold spare parts for use in the same machines. Both cases
turned upon the fact that the patentee had not collected on the prior
judgment and thus had not received any compensation for the infringing use-or, indeed, any compensation at all. Here, in contrast, the amount paid by Ford under the agreement was expressly
stated to include compensation for the use of the patented structures by Ford's purchasers; moreover, the agreement covered future
use and in this respect operated precisely like a license, with the result that after the agreement date, there was simply no infringing
27
use for which the patentee was entitled to compensation .... 9
Because the release expressly licensed continued use of the
patented combination in Ford cars, the sale of replacement tops
did not constitute contributory infringement.280
In contrast, the release preserved the patentee's rights
against pre-release contributory infringers. 281' The Court agreed
that "under the old common law rule, a release given to one jointtortfeasor necessarily released another, even though it expressly
stated that it would have no such effect." 28 2 However, the Court
also noted that Birdsell rejected the common law rule.m "'By our
law, judgment against one joint trespasser, without full satisfaction, is no bar to a suit against another for the same trespass.'
What is true of a judgment is true of a release." 284 The exclusionary clause in the release was effective.285
276. Id. at 494.

277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 479.
Aro, 377 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 500.

281. Id.
282. Id. at 501.

283. Id.

284. Aro, 377 U.S. at 501 (quoting Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485, 489
(1884)).
285. Id. at 502.
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Then, the Supreme Court considered what measure of damages could be recovered by the patentee against the contributory
infringer for its pre-release sales of replacement tops.26 The Supreme Court started from the premise that if "full compensation"
paid by a maker and seller can have the effect of releasing a user,
such a result should follow in the case of a contributory infringer.8 7
In such a case, full payment by or on behalf of the direct infringer
leaves nothing to be collected from the contributory infringer.'
The issue then became whether Ford's payment under the release
constituted full payment for the infringing use committed directly
by Ford's purchasers and contributorily by Aro. 2 9 The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the amount paid
by Ford under the settlement was in fact adequate compensation
that placed the plaintiff in as good a position as it would have occupied had there been no infringement.'
Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Sauder Tank Co., Inc. demonstrates the impact of Aro on customer suits.2 This was a sister
case to a patent action previously decided. In the first case, three
patents were found to be valid and infringed. 292 The trial court assessed damages in the form of a reasonable royalty for the infringement of all three patents and stipulated that the royalty represented full and complete satisfaction for any form of
infringement by the manufacturer or any of its purchasers.293
On appeal, the patentee argued that the trial court erred in
precluding subsequent actions against the manufacturer's customers.2
The patentee contended that the manufacturer had infringed only one of the patents by making and selling the infringing units, whereas its customers, by using the units, infringed the
two companion process patents. 295 The trial court rejected this argument because it concluded the infringing units were designed to
accomplish all of the contested claims of all three patents, and the
patentee had stipulated that the only compensation it received for
sale of products manufactured under the patents in suit is the initial purchase price. 2' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous
and affirmed the preclusion of customer litigation.297
286. Id.

287. Id.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 503.
Id.
Aro, 377 U.S. at 513.
511 F.2d 10 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.

294. Id.

295. Id.
296. Id. at 12-13.
297. The Federal Circuit put an early gloss on the full compensation rule in
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The Federal Circuit had occasion to construe the Aro and Wilson Supreme Court opinions in King Instrument Corp. v. Otari
Corp.298 In this case, the patentee prevailed and was awarded
damages as to machine sales and the sales of spare parts.' In a
first appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the award of damages on
machine sales, but remanded the award on spare parts."® The district court entered a permanent injunction against machine sales,
and subsequently modified the injunction to include spare parts as
well. 31' The infringer challenged the modified injunction to the extent it prohibited the sale of spare parts. ° The reviewing court,
citing Wilson, noted that the infringer had paid damages as to the
past infringing machine sales in full "and hence has received an
implied license on those sales. "31 Since the manufacturer was an
implied licensee, its sale of unpatented repair parts to its customers did not constitute direct infringement."'
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished those
facts in CarborundumCo. v. Molten Metal Equipment Innovations,
Inc. to reach an opposite result.0 6 Metaullics manufactured an
unpatented pump designed especially for use in its patented system for gas injection into molten metal.3" Metaullics also sold replacement parts for its pumps, and, in fact, estimated that replacement parts cost about $35,000 a year while the pumps cost
between $8,000 and $20,000. 30' Customers were free to buy spare
parts for Metaullics' pumps from other sources.' Metaullics successfully sued a competitor, MMEI, for contributory patent infringement resulting from MMEI's sale of its own pumps for use in
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The appellate court

opined that:
[Ihn appropriate circumstances, a patent owner may be able to recover
the patent owner's lost profits attributable to each of a series of infringers. In contrast, when damages must be based on a reasonable royalty ... [Aro] instructs us that a reasonable royalty is not to be separately calculated against each successive infringer. Once full recovery is
obtained from one infringer with respect to a particular infringing device, at most nominal additional damages may be awarded against another with respect to the same device...
Id. at 1561.
298. 814 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
299. Id. at 1564.
300. Id. at 1561.
301. Id.
302. Id.

303. Id. at 1564.
304. King Instrument, 814 F.2d at 1564. The court also recognized that the
sale of spare parts may or may not be an infringement. Id. It concluded that
the infringer could properly supply its customers with spare parts attributable to repair. Id.
305. 72 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
306. Id. at 875.
307. Id. at 876.
308. Id.
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the patented system. °9 The court awarded Metaullics lost profits
and issued an injunction against future sales of pumps or from future sales of repair spare parts for its pumps.1 0 MMEI challenged
the scope of the injunction arguing that since it compensated
Metaullics for its infringement of sales of its pumps with lost profit
damages, it obtained an implied license for its customers to repair
its pumps. " ' Thus, MMEI argued, it was entitled to sell spare
parts for its pumps to its customers in the future. 12
Because the injunction had been granted, Metaullics argued
that it did not seek or receive compensation for future sales of
spare parts.313 If the injunction had not issued, Metaullics believed
that it would have been entitled to lost profits on any future sales
of spare parts as well." 4 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed that Metaullics had not received compensation for future
sales of spare parts and affirmed the injunction. 15 The court went
on to distinguish this case from King Instruments, stating that
King Instruments had failed to prove entitlement to lost profits on
sales of repair parts under the entire market value rule.3 9
17
Finally, Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp."
considered several
aspects of the full compensation rule. Here, the patentee sought
an injunction against the manufacturer's customers to preclude
continued use.1 8 The patentee had been awarded its lost profits
for the infringer's sale of the devices in question. 319 The patentee
argued that it was entitled to an injunction because it had not
been paid yet.320 The infringer's parent company had filed a corporate guaranty that promised to pay the judgment by certified
check within thirty days of the appellate court's mandate.32" ' The
patentee intimated that the parent company might not pay the
judgment, but the reviewing court characterized such intimations
as "unsupported."322 The Federal Circuit concluded that the filing
of a corporate guaranty was "sufficiently equivalent to compensation" to warrant denial of an injunction against the infringer's customers. 323

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
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320.
321.
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323.

Id.
Id.
Carborundum, 72 F.3d at 887.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 882.
823 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1541.
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VI. THE FUTURE OF SEQUENTIAL LITIGATION UNDER THE SINGLE
RECOVERY RULE

As is the case in many areas of patent law, the nature of damages recoverable from an infringer's customers has shifted substantially over the years. To some extent, the shift from Birdsell
to Aro has been aided by the elimination of the right to recover an
infringer's profits in the Patent Act of 1946.24 Stated differently, a
patentee who suffers lost profits or loss of royalty income ordinarily can be compensated and made whole by the manufacturing infringer. In the usual course of events, the length of the accused
manufacturer's distribution chain should have no impact on the
patentee's ability to be made whole by the manufacturer. By contrast, if an infringer's profits were also recoverable, as was the
case between 1819 and 1946, making the patentee whole would be
a far more complicated matter.
Consequently, with the simplification of the damages recovery
model under the Patent Act of 1946, a patentee is much more
likely to receive full compensation from the first defendant, which
typically is the manufacturing infringer. Whether a court in a
subsequent suit decides a patentee has received full compensation
depends on the scope of the judgment, the construction of any settlement agreements and whether the damages previously recovered were compensation for the infringement along the entire
channel of trade. In any event, full satisfaction of those damages
along the channels of trade would seemingly permit an infringer's
customers to continue use of an infringing product. In view of the
modem theory of damages, it appears that efforts to procure recovery from different levels in the distribution (or user) chain will
be difficult to accomplish, so long as the manufacturer is solvent.
Nevertheless, the application of the single recovery rule
leaves several open questions. First, can a patentee preserve its
right to pursue an infringing competitor's customers? In theory, a
patentee could assert a claim against its competitors only for
"making" and later suing the customer for "using.""' This approach might apply when a patentee occupies two levels in the distribution chain and its patent covers both levels (i.e., an integrated
company that manufactures a patented component that is incorporated into a patented system). In this type of situation, an infringing manufacturer and its infringing customer might each be liable
for respective levels of damage to the patentee. However, even if
the exclusionary rights remain separate and independent, the is324. See Aro Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc., 377
U.S. 476, 505 n.20 (1964); 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1994).

325. A claim for "making" and "selling" after a first recovery might give rise
to an implied license defense (or an exhaustion defense) by the infringing
competitor's customer. E.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 814 F.2d
1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
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sue of whether compensation for "making" is sufficient to preclude
recovery for "using" lingers. Presumably, it is possible to create a
damage model limited to the "making" of a product that is intended to be resold, such as where the infringing product is used
as a loss leader for other products or services. 2 Whether this approach would be effective against an infringing competitor and its
customers in an "ordinary" marketing situation is even more
problematic, but the creativity of damage experts faced with a
proximate causation standard should not be underestimated.
Second, can a patentee that seeks only injunctive relief
against an infringing manufacturer obtain an injunction and damages against the manufacturer's customers? This would seem to
be an appropriate election of remedies by a patentee and a result
consistent with existing case law. On the other hand, a manufacturing defendant accused of infringement might assert a declaratory counterclaim in an effort to foreclose or preempt suit against
the manufacturer's customers. While it is beyond the scope of this
article to wade through the nuances of a declaratory judgment
counterclaims for a determination of damages, it does appear such
a claim would be ripe, if only because of a manufacturer's traditional indemnification obligations. 27
Third, what is the impact of an agreed or consent judgment,
which is often involved in patent cases? Such a judgment has the
same effect as a trial on the merits. Unless the judgment reserves
issues within its four corners, a subsequent suit on the same claim
or cause of action generally is barred'2 To the extent the judgment grants or denies relief, such as money damages, additional or
different relief cannot be obtained in a new lawsuit. 29 Thus, a patentee needs to be careful in crafting a consent judgment if the patentee plans to seek additional compensation downstream.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of patent damage law appears to have greatly
simplified full compensation for the patentee. In many cases, patent damage law allows continued use by an infringer's customers.
However, there appear to be at least some circumstances in which

326. See, e.g, Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(holding that the infringer's liability to compensate for injury is limited only
by proximate causation).
327. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(c) (West 1994) (stating
that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing
in goods of the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the
rightful claim of any third party by way of infringement.").
328. Epic Metal Corp. v. H.H. Robertson Co., 870 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
Kurzweg v. Marple, 841 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1988).
329. E.g., Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 871 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1989); Lubrizol
Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.1989).
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relief may be available against both the infringing manufacturer
and its customers.

